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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent law review article1 , I analyzed three opinions of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in which the 
Court was asked to review administrative determinations of the In-
ternational Trade Administration (IT A) ·of the Department of 
Commerce under the antidumping duty law.2 I concluded that the 
CAFC accorded the ITA more deference than appropriate on ques-
tions of statutory interpretation, s a conclusion premised in large 
part on the Federal Circuit's unique status within the federal court 
system as an Article III court possessing exclusive appellate juris-
diction over international trade matters. 4 Given this status, I ar-
gued, little or no judicial deference ought to be given ITA an-
tidumping duty determinations involving decisions of statutory 
interpretation. 6 
In this article, I undertake a similiar review of three recent 
Federal Circuit opinions6 involving an interpretation of the an-
tidumping duty statute by the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC). In two instances,7 the CAFC upheld the ITC's statu-
tory interpretation of the antidumping duty law; in the third 
decision,8 the court rejected the ITC's view. In this article, I argue 
that in the two cases where the Federal Circuit sustained the ITC's 
interpretation of the antidumping duty law, the court conducted 
an independent review, notwithstanding its purported deference to 
the Commission's expertise. In the third case, Bingham & Taylor 
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1. Kennedy, Judicial Review of Commerce Department Antidumping Duty Determi-
nation: Deference or Abdication?, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 19 (1986). 
2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677h (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
3. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
4. Id. at 33; see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982). 
5. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 33. 
6. Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Industries, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482 
(Fed. Cir. 1987); ICC Industries, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Ameri-
can Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
7. /CC Industries, 812 F.2d at 694; American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 994. 
8. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1482. 
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Div., Virginia Industries, Inc. v. United States,9 the CAFC re-
jected the ITC's interpretation of the antidumping duty law, con-
cluding that the deference rule was not applicable. The result of 
these three cases is that the Federal Circuit has effectively aban-
doned the deference rule in its review of ITC interpretations of the 
antidumping duty law. 
Even though the scrutiny which the Federal Circuit gave the 
ITC's interpretations seem in my view more intense than that to 
which the court has subjected the Commerce Department's inter-
pretations of the antidumping duty law, certainly no more defer-
ence is due one agency than the other. On the contrary, of the two, 
the ITC is probably more deserving of judicial deference given its 
superior resources. In any event, as I discuss more fully, in recogni-
tion of the Federal Circuit's expertise in the field of international 
trade, all citation to and seeming reliance on the deference rule 
should be abandoned in CAFC cases treating either an IT A or ITC 
statutory interpretation of the antidumping duty law. There is 
only one "master" of the antidumping duty law, and that is the 
Federal Circuit. 10 Any other conclusion is nothing short of the tail 
wagging the dog. 
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
The metes and bounds of the antidumping duty law have been 
described so well in the literature11 that I will only give the briefest 
of thumbnail sketches here. As presently enacted, the antidumping 
duty law is essentially the product of two statutes, Title VII of the 
9. Id. 
10. In Consumer Prod. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., Inc., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039 
(Fed. Cir. 1985), the court referred to the Commerce Department as the "master" of the 
antidumping duty law. 
11. Readers unfamiliar with the statutory background should find the following articles 
helpful. See, e.g., Horlick, Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Laws, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 828 (1984); Barshefsky & Cunning-
ham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 307 (1981); Hemmendinger & Barringer, The Defense of An-
tidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 427 (1981); Potts & Lyons, The Trade Agreements Act: 
Administrative Policy and Practice in Antidumping Investigations, 6 N.C.J . INT'L & CoM. 
REG. 483 (1981); Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Investigations 
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1 (1979); Note, Adminis-
tering the Revised Antidumping Law: Allocating Power Between the ITC and the Court of 
International Trade, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 883 (1982); Note, The Trade Agreements Act of 
1979: Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Duty Procedures, 14 J . INT'L L. & EcoN. 63 
(1979). 
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Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 12 which substantially altered the 
former antidumping duty law,13 and Title VI of the Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984,14 which made minor adjustments to the 1979 
act. 
The law, an international version of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 16 is designed to prevent price discrimination between national 
markets. An antidumping duty proceeding typically involves five 
stages, 16 beginning administratively with the ITA, which is respon-
sible for determining the sufficiency of the petition and whether 
imports of merchandise are being sold in the United States at less 
than fair value.17 The ITC, in turn, is responsible for determining 
whether a domestic industry is being materially injured or is likely 
to be injured by reason of such imports.18 The ITC and the IT A 
each conduct a two-step administrative proceeding lasting nine 
months to one year, that results in preliminary and final determi-
nation. 19 If both agencies reach final affirmative determinations, 
then a duty is imposed on imports of the offending merchandise in 
an amount equal to the margin of dumping.20 The dumping duty 
12. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at scattered sections of titles 5, 7, 
13, 19, 26, 28, 31 U.S.C.). 
13. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, §§ 160-171, 46 Stat. 763 (1931) (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1202 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1985)). 
14. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1986) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982 & 
Supp. 1985)). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). 
16. For a brief overview of the antidumping duty administrative process, see American 
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
17. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673a (1982 & Supp. 1985). Merchandise is sold at less than fair 
value when the foreign market value of the merchandise exceeds the U.S. price for that 
merchandise. Id. § 1673. "Foreign market value" is generally the price of merchandise in the 
foreign manufacturer's home market. In essence, the antidumping duty law is intended to 
prevent price discrimination between the home market and the U.S. market. 
18. Id. The term "material injury" is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, 
immaterial, or unimportant." Id. § 1677(A)(7); see Bello & Holmer, Recent Developments 
Regarding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Injury Determinations, 20 INT'L L. 689 
(1986); Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and 
After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076 (1981). See generally 
Ablondi & McCarthy, Impact of the United States International Trade Commission on 
Commercial 1'ransactions, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985); Minchew & Webster, Regulating 
Unfair Practices in International Trade: The Role of the United States International 
Trade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (1978); Leonard & Foster, The Metamor-
phosis of the U.S. International Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 719 (1976). 
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d, 1673b, 1673d. If the Commission reaches a negative pre-
liminary injury determination, the entire antidumping duty investigation is terminated. Id. 
§ 1673b(a). 
20. Id. § 1673. 
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order is enforced until revoked. It will only be revoked when injury 
or sales at less than fair value have ceased, and it cannot be re-
voked for at least two years after imposition, absent good cause 
shown.21 
An aggrieved party may seek judicial review in the Court of 
International Trade,22 whose decisions may be appealed as of right 
to the Federal Circuit. 23 The scope of judicial review in antidump-
ing duty cases is whether the administrative determination is "un-
supported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law,"24 the same standard found in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.26 It is the application by the Federal Cir-
cuit of the "otherwise not in accordance with law" standard of re-
view to ITC antidumping duty injury determinations which this 
article examines next. 26 
III. CAFC REVIEW OF ITC STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TIONS UNDER THE ANT/DUMPING DUTY LAW 
In three recent decisions, Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia 
Industries, Inc. v. United States,27 ICC Industries, Inc. v. United 
States,28 and American Lamb Co. v. United States,29 the Federal 
Circuit was asked to review various ITC interpretations of the an-
tidumping duty statute. In the Bingham decision, the court struck 
down the ITC interpretation,30 while in the ICC Industries and 
American Lamb cases, the ITC's view was sustained. 31 
In Bingham, five unfair trade petitions, four involving allega-
tions of dumping and one of unlawful subsidization, were filed by 
an American trade association of iron construction casting manu-
21. Id. § 1675(b). 
22. Id. § 1516a; 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982). 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
24. 19 u.s.c. § 1516(1)(8). 
25. 5 u.s.c. § 7-06 (1982). 
26. Although the three cases discussed in this article concern the antidumping duty 
law, the injury criteria are indentical in both antidumping duty cases and countervailing 
duty cases. Thus, my analysis is equally applicable to both kinds of proceedings. For two 
recent Federal Circuit decisions applying the substantial evidence standard to ITC an-
tidumping duty injury determinations, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 
F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
27. 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
28. 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
29. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
30. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1487. 
31. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 700; American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1004. 
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facturers. 32 In its preliminary injury determiilations33 in the four 
antidumping duty cases, the ITC found a reasonable indication of 
material injury to the domestic light and heavy Iron construction 
castings industries by reason of less-than-fair value sales of im-
ports from India, Canada, the Peoples Republic of China, and Bra-
zil. 34 With respect to the countervailing duty proceeding involving 
allegedly subsidized imports of light iron construction castings 
from Brazil, however, the ITC found no reasonable indication of 
injury to the domestic industry.36 The issue for review was whether 
section 771(7)(C)(iv) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,36 required the ITC to cumulate the 
volume and price effects of imports subject to an antidumping 
duty investigation, with import of like products subject to counter-
vailing duty investigation. In rejecting the ITC's position against 
cross-cumulation, the Court of International Trade answered this 
question in the affirmative. 37 The CAFC affirmed. 38 
Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge Davis began by conced-
ing that the language of section 771(7)(C)(iv) was not clear on its 
32. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1483. 
33. In antidumping duty and countervailing duty cases, both the Commerce Depart-
ment and the ITC make preliminary and final determinations. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 
167ld, 1673b, 1673d (1982 & Supp. 1985). For a general discussion of ITC injury determina-
tions, see Mock, Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the Inter-
national Trade Commission, 7 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 433, 434-39 (1986). 
34. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1483. 
35. Id. 
36. Section 771(7)(C)(i), (ii) & (iv) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i), (ii) & (iv) (1982 & Supp. 1985), provides: 
(i) Volume.-In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the Commis-
sion shall consider whether the volume of imports of the merchandise, or any in-
crease in that volume, either in absolute terms or relative to production or con-
sumption in the United States, is significant. 
(ii) Price.-In evaluating the effect of imports of such merchandise on prices, 
the Commission shall consider whether-
(1) there has been significant price undercutting by the imported merchandise 
as compared with the price of like products of the United States, and 
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a 
significant degree or prevents price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, 
to a significant degree. 
(iv) Cumulation.-For purposes of clauses (i) and (ii), the Commission shall 
cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports from two or more countries of 
like products subject to investigation if such imports compete with each other and 
with like products of the domestic industry in the United States market. 
37. Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia Industries, Inc. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 793, 
795 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
38. See Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1483. 
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face insofar as the cross-cumulation question was concerned.39 
Judge Davis also noted that the ITC, as an entity, had never cross-
cumulated, although individual commissioners had aggregated 
dumped and subsidized imports in their cumulation analyses:'0 
Against this muddied backdrop of ambiguous statutory language, 
coupled with an ITC practice adverse to cross-cumulation, the 
court turned to the legislative history of the Trade and Tariff Act 
of 1984, the act which added the cumulation requirement to the 
antidumping duty law.41 The portion .of the report of the House 
Ways and Means Committee on section 771(7)(C)(iv) quoted by 
the CAFC in support of a cross-cumulation requirement stated: 
The purpose of mandating cumulation under appropriate circum-
stances is to eliminate inconsistencies in Commission practice and 
to ensure that the injury test adequately addresses simultaneous 
unfair imports from different countries .... The Committee be-
lieves that the practice of cumulation is based on the sound princi-
ple of preventing material injury which comes about by virtue of 
several unfair acts or practices. •2 
Relying on this paper-thin piece of legislative history, the 
court concluded that "the Committee's use of generic terms collec-
tively describing dumped and subsidized imports in the committee 
report ... suggests that the statutory phrase 'subject to investiga-
tion' was intended to require cumulation of dumped and subsi-
dized imports."0 The CAFC buttressed its conclusion with the ad-
ditional observation that the cumulation provision was placed in 
the definitions section applicable generally to antidumping duty 
and countervailing duty proceedings.44 To the argument advanced 
by the ITC that the court should defer to its interpretation of the 
cumulation provision,46 the CAFC responded that because the 
ITC's interpretation was neither longstanding nor consistent with 
congressional intent, no deference was due it.46 Unfortunately, an 
opinion which was otherwise a tour de force was marred by the 
court's irrelevant, and worse illogical, observation that Congress 
39. Id. at 1485. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5164). 
43. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1485-86. 
44. Id. at 1486. 
45. Id. at 1487. 
46. Id. 
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had made no exception or exclusion for cross-cumulation,47 sug-
gesting that the absence of any reference to cross-cumulation es-
tablished the affirmative of the proposition, that cross-cumulation 
was statutorily mandated. 
In ICC Industries,48 a decision rendered less than two months 
before the Bingham case, the Federal Circuit considered two is-
sues. The first was whether an importer could be assessed with ret-
roactive antidumping duties because it knew or should have known 
that the imported merchandise was being sold at less than fair 
value.49 The second issue was whether the ITC was required to 
conduct a separate injury investigation for the period in which 
massive imports were occurring in order to impose antidumping 
duties retroactively.Go The court affirmed the Commerce Depart-
ment's determination that the importer possessed the requisite 
knowledge to warrant retroactive imposition of antidumping du-
ties, and further held. that the ITC was not required to conduct a 
separate injury investigation. Gt 
Most of the ICC Industries opinion took up the question of 
the ITA's conclusion that the importer had knowledge ofless-than-
fair-value sales.H With regard to the issue of whether the ITC was 
required to make a separate injury determination that massive im-
ports of the subject merchandise during the critical circumstances 
period were a discrete cause of material injury under the critical 
circumstances provision of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,Gs 
the court purported to defer to the ITC's interpretation of the an-
tidumping duty statute. H 
The importer arguedGG that the ITC was required to make one 
injury determination under 19 U.S.C. section 1673d(b)(l)(A)(i)H 
47. Id. at 1486. 
48. 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
49. Id. at 695. The International Trade Administration of the Department of Com-
merce is responsible for this phase of the antidumping duty proceeding. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1673d(a)(3), (b)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
50. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 695. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 696-99. 
53. "Critical circumstances" refers to either a history of dumping or massive imports of 
the merchandise under investigation of which the importer knows or has reason to know is 
being sold at less than fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e) (1982 & Supp. 1985). If critical cir-
cumstances are found to exist, antidumping duties will be assessed retroactively 90 days. Id. 
54. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 699. 
55. Id. 
56. That section provides: 
The Commission shall make a final determination of 
whether -
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and a second, separate injury determination under 19 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1673d(b)(4)(A).57 While in effect conceding that the importer's 
interpretation was reasonable, the CAFC summarily disposed of it 
with the observation that "it is not the interpretation made by the 
Commission. "58 After reciting the "judicial-deference-to-agency-in-
terpretation" litany,59 the court turned to the legislative history of 
the critical circumstances provision. There the CAFC found per-
suasive an excerpt from the House Ways and Means Committee 
report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which highlighted the 
need for expeditious relief to domestic industries injured by mas-
sive imports of competing merchandise.6° Consequently, the court 
concluded, 
[t]he Commission's interpretation [of the antidumping duty stat-
ute as permitting one material injury finding to be used in both the 
critical circumstances and final injury determination phases] is 
consistent with the congressional goal of providing meaningful re-
lief to the domestic industries under the time limitations within 
which a final determination must be made.61 
Even though the CAFC appears to have based its decision on def-
erence to agency discretion, a closer look indicates that in fact it 
undertook an independent review, examining the legislative history 
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially re-
tarded, by reason of imports of the merchandise with respect to which the adminis-
tering authority [International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce] 
has made an affirmative determination under subsection (a)(l) of this section (19 
U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(l)). 
57. That section provides: 
If the finding of the administering authority under subsection (a)(2) of this sec-
tion is affirmative, then the final determination of the Commission shall include a 
finding as to whether the material injury is by reason of massive imports described 
in subsection (a)(3) of this section to an extent that, in order to prevent such mate-
rial injury from recurring, it is necessary to impose the duty imposed by section 
1673 of this title retroactively on those imports. 
58. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 699. 
59. See id. The "judicial-deference-to-agency-interpretation" litany goes as follows: 
"An agency's interpretation of a statute is to be sustained unless unreasonable," "an 
agency's interpretation of a statute is to be sustained unless plainly inconsistent with the 
statute," '-'an agency's interpretation of a statute is to be held valid unless weighty reasons 
require otherwise," and "an agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the only reason-
able interpretation or the one the court views as the most reasonable." Id. 
60. Id. at 699-700. 
61. Id. at 700. 
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for itself62 and reaching its own conclusion that the ITC's interpre-
tation was reasonable. 63 
The third CAFC decision, American Lamb Co. v. United 
States,64 laid to rest an issue that had long plagued the ITC in 
litigation before the Court of International Trade:65 whether it was 
permissible for the ITC to weigh all conflicting evidence in its pre-
liminary injury determinations.66 This practice of the ITC, in effect 
since 1974,67 was rejected by the Court of International Trade.68 
The domestic industry objected to this practice, in the main, be-
cause it resulted in more negative preliminary injury determina-
tions than would otherwise have been the case. 69 The Federal Cir-
cuit accepted the ITC's view.70 
In making its preliminary injury determination, the ITC is di-
rected to make a determination "based upon the best information 
available to it at the time of the determination, of whether there is 
a reasonable indication"71 that a domestic industry is being materi-
ally injured by reason of the imports subject to investigation. After 
invoking the obligatory "judicial-deference-to-agency-interpreta-
tion" litany,72 the CAFC found the ITC's 12-year interpretation to 
be within the antidumping duty statutory framework,73 particu-
larly given the Commission's requirement that before an investiga-
tion is terminated at the preliminary stage, the record as a whole 
must contain clear and convincing evidence that no material injury 
exists. 74 The Federal Circuit pointed out the absurdity of any other 
interpretation: 
[T]he notion that allegations in a petition found unsupportable be-
cause of overwhelming contradictory evidence should nonetheless 
62. See id. at 699-700. 
63. See id. at 700. 
64. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
65. See Jeanette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1985); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
66. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 997. 
67. See id. at 999. 
68. See Jeanette Sheet Glass, 607 F. Supp. at 123; Republic Steel, 591 F. Supp. at 640. 
69. By precluding the ITC from considering any evidence negating allegations of mate-
rial injury at the preliminary injury stage, affirmative preliminary determinations would re-
sult whenever information accompanying the petition raised the possibility of material in-
jury. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. A negative preliminary injury determination 
terminates an antidumping duty proceeding. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
70. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a). 
72. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
73. Id. 
74. 19 u.s.c. § 1673d(b) (1982). 
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result in a full investigation and potential imposition of provisional 
remedies is directly contrary to Congress' intent ... of eliminating 
"unnecessary and costly investigations" and the "impediment to 
trade" that would reside in an unwarranted imposition of provi-
sional remedies. 76 
Through a process of gathering and considering all available 
evidence within the 45-day preliminary injury investigation period, 
the CAFC concluded that this legislative purpose would be effectu-
ated. 76 Thus, while purporting to defer to agency statutory inter-
pretation, the court in American Lamb again conducted an inde-
pendent review of the legislative history, satisfying itself that the 
ITC's interpretation was consistent with congressional intent 
before approving the agency's view. 
At first blush, these three decisions appear to be run-of-the-
mill administrative law cases. The ICC Industries and American 
Lamb opinions both echo the standard . rules regarding judicial def-
erence to agency interpretations of the statute which the agency is 
charged with administering. Even the Bingham opinion acknowl-
edged that ordinarily deference is due an agency's statutory inter-
pretation. 77 Given the wealth of Supreme Court decisions that are 
the foundation for the deference rule,78 these three Federal Circuit 
cases certainly are in the mainstream. However, the deference rule 
and its rationale that the expert agency view on the subject ought 
to be followed by the judiciary are not immutable shibboleths. The 
Supreme Court itself has recognized that expert discretion has its 
limits. "Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative 
process," the Court has acknowledged, "but unless we make the 
requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, ex-
75. American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1004 (quoting S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 
171, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7308). 
76. Id. 
77. See Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1487. 
78. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 
2778, 2782 (1984); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 443, 451 (1978); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 
426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 29.16, at 400 (1978); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND PROCESS § 7.7, at 405-07 (1985) [hereinafter PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL]; Levin, Fed-
eral Scope-of-Review Standards: A Preliminary Restatement, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 97 
(1985); Boudreau, To Defer or Not to Defer: The Question for the D.C. Circuit in Reviewing 
FCC Decisions 36 FED. CoM. L.J. 293 (1984); Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Adminis-
trative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587 (1984); Pierce & Shapiro, 
Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1175 (1981); Woodward & 
Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 
(1979) [hereinafter Woodward & Levin]. 
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pertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster 
which rules with no practical limits on its discretion. "79 Thus, 
agency discretion is far short of unbridled. As the Court has noted, 
"[t]he deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to 
slip into judicial inertia. "80 In international trade litigation before 
the Federal Circuit, the force of the deference rule is especially 
weak and should be abandoned in cases involving issues of agency 
statutory interpretation. 
IV. ABANDONING DEFERENCE IN CAFC REVIEW OF 
ITC STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS 
Review by the Federal Circuit of ITC interpretations of the 
antidumping duty statute differs little in form from appellate re-
view of agency decisions currently conducted by the other 12 
courts of appeals. 81 The standard of review of agency decisions 
contained in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,82 and codified in 
the Administrative Procedure Act,83 is whether the agency's deci-
sion is supported by the substantial evidence on the record or is 
otherwise in accordance with law.84 This standard, however; tells 
reviewing . courts little of the process to be followed ·in applying it 
to a given case. 
While the Federal Circuit and the other courts of appeals use 
the same standard of review when reviewing agency action, the un-
usual element in CAFC review is that ITC antidumping duty de-
terminations come to the Federal Circuit only after they have been 
reviewed first by the Court of International Trade. 86 Even though 
79. Burlington Truck Lines v United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (emphasis in 
original). 
80. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 271 
(1968). 
81. These courts have reviewed agency determinations from the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982)); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (see 28 
U.S.C § 2342(4) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1982)); the Interstate Commerce Commission (see 
28 U.S.C. §2321 (1982)); or the Federal Communications Commission (see 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) 
(1982); 28 u.s.c. § 2342(2) (1982)). 
82. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). In that case, Justice Frankfurter· candidly noted the unavoid-
able role that judicial discretion plays in the review of agency action: 
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certi-
tude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion 
in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judg-
ing or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. 
Id. at 488-89. 
83. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1982). 
84. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(c), 2640(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985); 19 U.S.C. §§ 
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judicial scrutiny of antidumping duty determinations has been 
doubled, paradoxically the CAFC treats antidumping duty and 
countervailing duty appeals essentially as if the Court of Interna-
tional Trade had never initially reviewed the matter. In Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States,86 the Federal Cir-
cuit was called upon to review an antidumping duty order 
revocation proceeding conducted by the ITC. The threshold ques-
tion addressed by the CAFC was whether "in reviewing determina-
tions of injury or likelihood of injury in antidumping cases, we re-
view the Court's [Court of International Trade's] decision to 
determine if it is based on a fair assessment of the record . . . or 
whether we directly review the determination of the Commission 
• • • • "
87 The court gave the following answer: 
There is no question but that under our jurisdictional statute 
it is the Court's decision that is °before us .... However, resolution 
of whether the Court correctly held that the Commission's decision 
was not supported by the substantial evidence requires considera-
tion of the evidence presented to and the analysis by the Commis-
sion. Thus, to determine whether the Court correctly applied the 
statutory standard of [review], we must review the Commission's 
decision .... Only if we agree with the lower court's conclusion on 
this initial question would we reach the question whether the court 
properly disposed of the case by reversal, rather than remand.88 
Thus, the Federal Circuit reviews an ITC determination virtually 
as if no review had taken place at the Court of International 
Trade.89 
The wisdom of having this additional layer of judicial review 
in light of the attendant delay and cost is questionable.90 More im-
1516a(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) & 1516a(b). See generally Note, Administering the Revised An-
tidumping Law: Allocating Power between the ITC and the Court of International Trade, 
22 VA. J . INT'L L. 883 (1982). 
86. 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
87. Id. at 932 (emphasis in original). 
88. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
89. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
("We review that court's review of an ITC determination by applying anew the statute's 
express judicial review standard."). 
90. Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S . Court of International Trade, 4 DICK. J. 
INT'L L. 13, 22 (1985). In 1983, a bill was introduced in the Senate to repeal the jurisdiction 
of the Court of International Trade in antidumping duty and countervailing duty cases. S. 
1672, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 10,755-57 (1983). The bill was designed to reduce 
litigation expense and delay in antidumping duty and countervailing duty appeals. As noted 
in the fact sheet accompanying the bill: 
Under current law, the U.S. Court of International Trade is the court for review 
of AD/CVD cases. The bill would assign this responsibility to the Court of Appeals 
12
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portantly and pertinent in the present context, however, is that if 
Congress genuinely intended for the courts to defer to the determi-
nations of the ITC, granting litigants two opportunities to appeal 
such determinations to the Federal judiciary as a matter of right 
- one opportunity more than is typically the case in administra-
tive law cases - would seem inconsistent with this intent. If ITC 
determinations, and for that matter, IT A determinations as well, 
are entitled to great judicial deference, why expose such determi-
nations twice to the gauntlet of judicial review? At least one an-
swer, of course, is that Congress did not believe that deference was 
due to such determinations because of an apprehension that politi-
cal considerations might shape them. By screening these determi-
nations through the courts twice, the administering agencies would 
be on notice that if extralegal considerations enter into a determi-
nation, that determination runs a substantial risk of ultimately be-
ing reversed. A fair inference from this two layer scheme of judicial 
review is that Congress is not convinced that ITA and ITC anti-
dumping determinations should be shielded from intense judicial 
probing. 
Although it can only be inferred from this dual judicial review 
scheme that Congress intended little or no deference be accorded 
ITC determinations, a more explicit congressional pronouncement 
found in the legislative history of the Customs Courts Act of 
1980,91 substantially undercuts the "agency expertise" rationale for 
for the Federal Circuit. 
AD/CVD cases are currently subject to a two-step appeals process, in which 
determinations are first appealed to the Court of International Trade and then to 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The only function of the courts in 
these cases is to conduct an appellate review of the agency proceedings. By elimi-
nating the first step in the process, the bill brings the import relief area into con-
formity with the usual administrative practice and reduces the costs associated with 
appellate review by two different courts. 
129 CONG. REC. 10,757 (1983). The Senate bill was deleted from the final version of the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 
91. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). The Customs Courts Act of 1980 was chiefly designed to clarify and enlarge the 
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1, 19-20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729. See generally Co-
hen, Recent Decisions of the Court of International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A Pri-
mer and a Critique, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 700 (1984); Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) : A View from the Plaintiff's Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 793 (1984); 
Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International Trade Under the Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 471 (1981); Rodino, The Customs Courts 
Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 459 (1981). 
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judicial deference. In the House Report92 on that 1980 Act, re-
peated reference was made to the "specialized expertise"93 of the 
Federal Circuit in international trade litigation: 
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 creates a comprehensive system 
of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions, 
utilizing the specialized expertise of the United States Customs 
Court [the predecessor court of the Court of International Trade] 
and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
[which was merged with the Court of Claims in 1982 to form the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit].9" 
In addition, in listing the major goals of the Customs Courts 
Act, the House Report emphasized "Congress' intent that the ex-
pertise [of the Court of International Trade and the Federal Cir-
cuit] be exclusively utilized in the resolution of conflicts and dis-
putes arising out of the tariff and international trade laws . . .. "96 
Thus, given Congress' explicit recognition of the CAFC's special 
expertise in international trade matters, it is highly debatable 
whether the Federal Circuit should show any deference to the ITC 
in cases of statutory interpretation. 
Although the CAFC stated in these three cases that deference 
is due to ITC interpretations of the antidumping duty law, does 
the Federal Circuit in fact defer? Posing the questions somewhat 
differently, would the results have differed in the three cases under 
discussion if the CAFC had reviewed the ITC determinations using 
a "no deference even if sufficiently reasonable" standard of review? 
V. THE "NO DEFERENCE" STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Bingham, the Federal Circuit concluded that the ITC's in-
terpretation of the cumulation provision of the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984 was directly a~ odds with congressional intent regard-
ing the issue of cross-cumulation.96 The court consequently had no 
difficulty rejecting the ITC's view in favor of one which it consid-
ered to be congruous with what Congress intended. Had there been 
a longstanding agency practice on the cross-cumulation question, 
the case might have been closer. Given that there was none,97 the 
92. H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 91. 
93. Id. at 20. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 28. 
96. Bingham, 815 F.2d at 1487. 
97. See id. 
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CAFC was not put to any hard choices. But even had there been 
such a practice, the court in all likelihood would have still rejected 
the ITC's position because it would have run counter to the Fed-
eral Circuit's reading of the objective of the cumulation provision 
as revealed in the legislative history.98 In short, because the CAFC 
found the ITC's statutory interpretation to be unreasonable, there 
would have been no opportunity to apply a "no deference even if 
sufficiently reasonable" standard of review. 
In ICC Industries, the court in effect conceded that the im-
porters' interpretation of the critical circumstances statute was 
reasonable.99 Although the CAFC recited the "judicial-deference-
to-agency-interpretation" boilerplate,100 its acceptance of the ITC's 
interpretation seems less predicated on deference to agency action 
than on that interpretation's consistency with congressional in-
tent. 101 The legislative history available was scant, but it did never-
theless support the ITC's position for ·prompt relief. Thus, the 
Federal Circuit was not writing on a clean slate but rather had 
some legislative history, albeit meager, to guide it through the stat-
utory shoals. On balance, while the ICC Industries case might have 
been closer had a no deference standard of review been applied, 
the result would have probably been the same. 
Finally, in American Lamb, the court was placed in the posi-
tion of having to vacate the decision of the Court of International 
Trade in order to uphold the ITC's interpretation of the anti-
dumping duty statute, unlike in Bingham and ICC Industries, 
where the CAFC affirmed the Court of International Trade. fur-
thermore, the court in American Lamb had to vacate a lower court 
decision whose reasoning was "fully acceptable."102 Once again, 
however, what was decisive for the CAFC in upholding the ITC's 
view in American Lamb, as it was in sustaining that view in ICC 
Industries and rejecting it in Bingham, was congressional intent: 
Congress' requirement that ITC conduct a thorough investigation, 
using the best information available to it, Congress' expectation of 
opportunity for interested parties to present their views, and Con-
gress' provision of the "reasonable indication" standard for use in 
investigations initiated in response to a petition and in ITC's self-
98. See id. 
99. ICC Industries, 812 F.2d at 699 (where the court stated that the importers' view 
"may be one of the possible interpretations"). 
100. Id. 
101. See id. at 699-700. 
102. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 1001. 
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initiated investigations - all militate against a view that Congress 
intended ITC to disregard evidence that clearly and convincingly 
refutes the allegations in a petition. 103 
The Federal Circuit added that the Court of International 
Trade's reading of "reasonable indication" of injury (as being sy-
nonymous with "mere possibility" of injury) did not conform with 
the congressional desire to weed out nonmeritorious cases at an 
early stage of an investigation.104 
Considering that the CAFC had to work against the momen-
tum of a lower court decision invalidating the ITC's interpretation, 
the case might have been closer had the court applied a no defer-
ence standard of review in American Lamb. However, it is fair to 
state that the decision of the Court of International Trade was 
simply out of step with the wealth of legislative history supporting 
the ITC's interpretation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If application of a "no deference even if sufficiently reasona-
ble" standard of review would not have changed the result in any 
of these three cases, why adopt such a standard? Indeed, the need 
for adoption of such a rule seems minimal because de facto, the 
Federal Circuit appears to be applying such a standard and merely 
paying lip service to the deference rule. As commentators are quick 
to point out, no matter how much deference is shown, a court 
never actually affirms an agency interpretation of a statutory pro-
vision without first independently analyzing it and its legislative 
history.106 If the court finds a conflict, it reverses under any stan-
dard of review.106 
A no deference standard of review ought to be formally 
adopted by the Federal Circuit if for no other reason than judicial 
candor, but several other more compelling reasons exist for doing 
so. First, adopting a "no deference even if sufficiently reasonable" 
standard of review would firmly establish the CAFC's status as the 
expert tribunal in the field of international trade law, a position it 
could rightfully claim, given its exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
103. See id. at 1003. 
104. Id. at 1001-02. 
105. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 78, at 376-77; Woodward & Levin, supra 
note 78, at 332-35. 
106. See id. 
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over the subject area. As noted, 107 Congress has implicitly and ex-
pressly recognized this judicial expertise, most revealingly through 
the double-layered scheme of judicial review to which ITC anti-
dumping duty and countervailing duty determinations are 
subjected. 
A second reason for CAFC adoption of a no deference rule is 
that every antidumping duty determination reached by the ITC 
touches upon matters of international importance, because every 
such determination affects international trade between one or 
more other countries and the world's largest economic power. 
A third reason for explicitly rejecting the deference rule in 
CAFC review of either ITC or IT A statutory interpretations, is the 
in terrorem effect such a declaration would have on these agencies 
should they become emboldened by the deference rule to stray far 
afield of congressional intent. Adoption of a no deference standard 
of review would send a message to those agencies that they are not 
superior to courts in the interpretation of the antidumping duty 
statute while reaffirming that statutory interpretation is quintes-
sentially and ultimately a judicial, not an administrative, 
function. 108 
None of the foregoing should suggest that the ITC is unable or 
unwilling to take into account considerations of the public interest 
or that the Federal Circuit should exhibit an overweening attitude 
toward the Commission. Given the depth of expertise and the 
breadth of views brought to the Commission by the six commis-
sioners and staff, its views on the meaning of the U.S. trade laws 
should not be cavalierly rejected by the courts.109 At the same 
time, however, a panel of court of appeals judges who are them-
selves members of an expert Federal court, should not be daunted 
by the prospect of rejecting an ITC interpretation of the anti-
dumping duty law. Indeed, the CAFC should not hesitate to do so, 
even in cases where the court believes that the ITC's interpretation 
107. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978) (where it is stated that the courts 
are "final authorities on issues of statutory construction"). 
109. The six ITC commissioners are appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, serve for a term of nine years, and must be qualified to develop 
expert knowledge of international trade matters. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b) (1982) . Not more 
than three of the commissioners may be members of the same political party. Id. § 1330(a). 
The Commission has the support of an expert staff of attorneys, economists, accountants, 
and statisticians. See Berg, Petitioning and Responding Under the Escape Clause: One 
Practitioner's View On How To Do It, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 407, 409 (1981) . 
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is reasonable, if the court would have reached a different conclu-
sion had the issue come before it initially in a judicial proceeding. 
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